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This  report  examines  the  state of implementation  of the current telecommunications 
regulatory framework prior to the Commission review of its operation and the introduction 
of  proposals to adapt it to market and technological developments. The report 
)l>  assesses the extent to  which the principles of the  harmonisation directives
1  have  been 
transposed into national law 
)l>  analyses the way in which the transposed national rules apply those principles in practice 
)l>  backs up this assessment with an overview of  the current status of  the telecommunications 
services markets in the Member States. 
The report concludes by 
)l>  identifying  the  major  outstanding  barriers  to  the  achievement  of a  single  European 
market, and 
)l>  setting  out  a  number  of elements  which  will  need  to  be  taken  into  account  in  the 
legislative process leading to the revised regulatory framework, the Commission's vision 
of  which is set out in the Communication on the revi~. 
The key conclusion is that, twenty-one months after the introduction of full competition, 
the regulatory framework now in place drives telecommunications services markets in 
the Member States with an accelerating growth rate, large numben of market entrants 
and falling tariffs. 
The national markets will be worth·around EUR 161  billion in 1999
3
, just under 7% up on 
1998; the value of  mobile services will have increased on average by around 16%. There are 
now more than 240 operaton actually providing long distance and International (ails in 
the Member States, and more than 220 providing local calls; more than 180 operaton offer 
national and international and 375 offer local network services".  Many more  licences 
haye been issued  in  these  market segments, indicating further  increases  in  activity in the 
future. The number of  Internet hosts per thousand inhabitants is estimated to have grown 
at an average of125% across the Union from January 1998 to July 1999
5
• 
Residential tariffs over the period 1997 to  1999 are down  in  most Member States  for 
international calls, on average by 40% 
6
;  business tariffs for similar calls are also down in 
4 
6 
Transposition of the liberalisation directives has been completed by all Member States with the exception 
of Portugal and  Greece,  which are due  to  liberalise  fully  on 1 January  2000  and 31  December  2000 
respectively. 
Communication on the  Review of the Regulatory Framework for  Electronic Communications Services, 
COM(1999} 539. 
Voice telephony, mobile, network and  data services.  Source:  EITO (European Information Technology 
Observatory}, 1999. 
Source: National Regulatory Authorities. 
Source: Internet Software Consortium. 
Source: Eurodata Foundation. Ten minute calls. most Member States, on average by 25% over the same period. Tariffs for 1  0-minute regional 
and long-distance calls have decreased by 13% and 30% respectively. 
Underpinning these figures are effective licensing, interconnection, tariff, numbering and 
frequency regimes in the Member States, supervised by regulatory authorities on the basis 
of  Community and WTO principles. 
There remain. important problems to be resolved, in terms both of failures  to  implement 
fully  the Community framework and of possible limitations in the framework itself. These 
have in some cases resulted in considerable barriers to the creation of a single market for 
telecoms services in Europe. There is in addition a sense on the part of  some consumers that 
the benefits are not always clear. The regulatory package, which evolved over a period of  ten 
years, has also inevitably been overtaken in some areas by the rapidity of the technological 
and market change it was designed to promote. The task therefore is to pinpoint those aspects 
of the current framework which  remain to be fully  implemented and those  on which the 
review of  the regulatory framework needs to focus. If  in its input to the Communication on · · 
the review the report concentrates to a certain extent on present weaknesses this should not 
obscure the successes that have been achieved. 
The main messages for the review are: 
>  The comparatively low level of harmonisation in particular of the Community licensing 
and interconnection regimes represents a barrier to the single market. 
> The wide divergences in the way in which Community rules are implemented at national 
level raise further barriers. 
>  The  national  regulatory  authorities  are  close  to  national  markets  and  perform  an 
essential  task  in  assisting  in  achieving  uniform  implementation  of the  Community 
framework.  Their  role  is  hampered,  however,  by  disparities  In  the  powers  and 
resources with which they are equipped, the way in which regulatory tasks are shared 
with other bodies,  and differences  in  the procedures in place. NRAs need to be more 
active in particular in securing interconnection agreements. 
>  The  lack of a  proper  national  implementation  of the  regulatory  framework  for  cost 
accounting in many Member States seems to be contributing to extensive price squeezes 
in particular between retail and interconnection tariffs, and to excessive tariffs for leased 
lines. 
>  There is currently a lack of competition In the local access market in all Member States~ 
although steps are being taken to issue wireless local loop licences and to use national 
regulation to  provide  alternative ways of accessing the  'last mile'.  Moreover,  CATV 
networks remain controlled by the incumbent operators in certain .Member States. 
>  In view of concerns in the market that universal service funding schemes constitute a 
barrier to market entry, there is a need for a rigorous assessment of the real net costs of 
universal service provision. There is no evidence that voice telephony tariffs applied by 
the incumbents have actually been rebalanced. Rebalancing is necessary to avoid price 
squeezes between interconnection charges and retail rates and to promote competition in 
2 access markets (including price unbundling). Given the absence of- comparable- cost 
accounting systems, verification of whether or not rebalancing has actually occurred is 
currently difficult or impossible for the ~ommission. 
~ There are disparities in consumer protection across the Union due to differences in the 
way  in  which  consumer  interests  are  dealt  with  by  individual  Member  States  and 
differences in treatment depending on the telecommunications service in question. 
~ Finally, the current framework does not explicitly address issues such as· special schemes 
for  Internet access,  or the  safeguards  to  be  applied  to  avoid  possible  distortions  of 
competition arising from the integration of  voice/data and fixed/mobile services. 
( 
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In 1993 the European Community and its Member States committed themselves, in line with 
the Treaty and in advance of agreement on the global opening of markets under the GATS
7
, 
to the liberalisation of the European telecommunications services sector on 1 January 1998. 
The necessary Community legislation was made up primarily of a series of directives having 
as their objective the creation of  a single market for telecommunications services• in Europe. 
The move to  a liberalised and harmonised Community market was driven by a number of 
well-documented phenomena, in particular the globallsation of  markets and rapid advances 
in technology. Other events, such as the rapid rise in mobile penetration rates, the spread of 
the  Internet,  and  the  convergence  of  the  telecommunications,  broadcasting  and 
information  technology  sectors,  were  largely  unforeseen,  at  least  at  the  outset  of the 
process. Underpinning the resulting regulatory framework was the political objective, set out 
in the Treaty in terms of  the need to secure growth, employment and competitiveness and 
protect the interests of consumers, of ensuring a wide choice of providers and services, 
innovation, competitive &trices and quality of service. The whole process of liberalisation 
and harmonisation has been accompanied by the ongoing enforcement of the  competition 
rules laid down in tJ:te TreatY'. 
In  view  of the  importance  of the  telecommunications  regulatory  package
10  to  users, 
consumers, service providers, manufacturers of equipment and the wider EU  ~conomy, and 
the need to ensure compliance with the WTO/GATS agreement, the Commission took steps 
before the date of full  liberalisation to secure full implementation, in line with the Council 
Resolution of  21 November 1996
11
• The pillars of this monitoring and enforcement exercise 
have been the series of reports  to  the Council and European Parliament submitted by the 
Commission from May 1997
12  and the Commission's use of the Article 226
13  infringement 
prqcedure to enforce compliance
14
• Early implementation reports focused on the transposition 
into national law of  the key elements of  the directives; more recently, not least in this Report, 
attention has moved to the effective application of nationally transposed rules. 
The  adoption  of this  Report  meets  the  requirement  in  the  Interconnection,  Licensing, 
amended Leased Lines, amended ONP Framework and amended Voice Telephony Directives 
General agreement on trade in services, Telecommunications agreement in force 5 February 1998. 
The parallel liberalisation and harmonisation of the  provision of telecommunications equipment is  not 
included in the scope of  this Communication. 
9  In particular Articles Stand 82 (formerly 85 and 86). 
10  A full list of  the directives, decisions and recommendations making up the telecoms regulatory package is 
given in Annex 2 to the Fourth Report.  . 
11  Council Resolution of  21 November 1996 on new policy priorities regarding the Information Society, OJ C 
376, 12.12.1996. 
ll  First  Report  on  the  Implem~tation of the  Telecommunications  Regulatory  Package,  29 May  1997, 
COM(97) 236; Second Report, 8 October 1997, COM(97) 504, Third Report, 18 February 1998, COM(98) 
80; Fourth Report, 25 November 1998, COM(98) 594. 
13  Formerly Article 169. 
14  There are currently 57 proceedings running in relation to the Council and European Parliament Directives 
adopted pursuant to Article lOOa (now Article 95) and 30 in relation to the Commission Directives adopted 
pursuant to Article 90 (now Article 86). 
5 to report to the Council and European Parliament
15 on their functioning. It also coincides with 
the launch of the Commission's review of the current regulatory framework in pursuance of 
the requirement in the directives to assess any adaptations necessary in the light of  technical 
and market developments. The Communication on the review, in looking forward to propose 
principles  for  a  regulatory  framework  for  the  foreseeable  future,  must  be  based  on  an 
overview of  the extent to which the current framework has been successfully transposed and 
applied, the shortcomings in implementation of the EC framework at national level, and any 
failings in that framework. 
The  conclusions  of the  Report  are  complemented  by  the  messages  flowing  from  the 
consultations on the Convergence
16  and Radio  Spectrum
17  Green Papers and the report ·on 
Digital Television in the European Union
18
• 
The Commission's assessment in this Report is based on a series of meetings held between 
June  and  September  1999  with representative  groupings  and  associations  of new entrant 
operators
19
,  pan-European operators and groupings
20
,  user and consumer groups
21
,  incumbent 
operators and representatives of the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and relevant 
ministries, covering all fifteen Member States. In addition, detailed market data were received 
from each of  the NRAs. 
The situation taken into account in  the Report is  that at 1 October 1999
21
•  Comments 
received  from  Member  States  on  Annex  3 up  to  12  October  have  been  taken  into 
account. 
The Commission has  used in this  Report the methods of assessment of transposition and 
effective application of nationally transposed rules set out in the Fourth Report. As regards 
transposition of  the directives, the Commission has carried out an article-by-article review of 
the key provisions of  the main hannonisation directives. The Commission's assessment of  the 
extent to which nationally transposed measures are being applied effectively in the Member 
States has been made on the basis of  an analysis of  compliance with the indicators, set out in 
the Fourth Report, reflecting the most important principles and requirements of  the regulatory 
package. 
The Commission intends, pending adoption of  the revised regulatory framework, to continue 
the reporting process in order to consolidate the gains already made and to  identify areas 
where rapid initiatives in the form of  recommendations or other action may be necessary. 
15  Article 22 of the Interconnection Directive 97/33/EC (OJ L  199, 26.7.1997); Article 23 of the Licensing 
Directive 97/13/EC (OJ L 117, 7.5.1997); Article 14 of the Leased Lines Directive 92/44/EEC and Article 
8 of the Framework Directive 90/387/EEC, as amended by Directive 97/51/EC (OJ L 295,  29.10.1997); 
Article 31 of  the amended Voice Telephony Directive 98/10/EC (OJ L 101, 1.4.1998). 
16  COM(1999) 108 of  5 March 1999 reporting on the consultations associated with COM(97) 623. 
,.,  COM(1999) 538 reporting on the consultations associated with COM(l998) 596. 
II  COM(1999) 540. 
19  A  list  of the  operators  represented  is  posted  on  http//www.isJ>9.cec.be.infosoc/telecompolicy  and 
http//www.europa.eu.int/commldg4/lawliber.libera. 
10  EITIRT, ECTEL, Satellite Action Plan Regulitory Working Group, ElNO, EuroiSPA. 
11  INTUG, BEUC. 
11  The market data in Annex 4 is that received up to September 1999; each table refers to the date of  validity 
of  the data used therein. 
6 2.  STATUS  OF  TRANSPOSITION  OF  THE  LIBERALISATION  AND  HARMONISATION 
DIRECTIVES 
The Third Report gave an overview of  the transposition of all of  the directives making up the 
regulatory  package,  and  noted  gaps  in  the  transposition  of two  important  directives  · 
(Licensing, Interconnection) for which the deadline for adoption of national measures  fell 
shortly before the finalisation of that report. The Fourth Report focused on the way in which 
the  principles  in  those  two  directives,  together  with  the  revised  Voice  Telephony  and 
amended Leased Lines Directives, had been taken over into national law, and concluded that 
the necessary measures to transpose were very largely in place in most Member States. 
The present Report now gives a consolidated overview of the transposition of the most 
important harmonisation directives, including those referred to in the preceding paragraph 
and  also  taking  into  account  the  ONP  Framework  Directive,  as  amended  regarding  the 
independence of NRAs and the separation of the operational and regulatory functions,  the 
sector-specific  Data  Protection  Directive,  for  which  the  transposition  deadline  was  24 
October 1998
23
,  and the Numbering Directive, the deadline for  which
24  was  31  December 
1998. The details of  transposition of  these directives are given in Annex 2. The situation can 
be summarised as follows:· 
The  ONP Framework Directive 90/387/EEC  is  substantially  transposed by all  Member 
States.  Its amendment by Directive 97/51/EC is  substantially transposed into the national 
legislation of  eleven Member States and partially transposed by two (Luxembourg, Austria); 
two Member States have recently notified measures of transposition which are  still under 
examination by the Commission's services (Greece and Portugal). 
The Leased Lines Directive 92/44/EEC has been substantially transposed by twelve Member 
Stat~s. It  is partially transposed in  two  Member States (Belgium  and  Luxembourg).  One 
Member State has recently notified transposition measures which are still under examination 
by the Commission's services (})ortugal). The amendment of the Leased Lines Directive by 
Directive 97/51/EC is substantially"transposed into the national legislation of  eleven Member 
States and partially transposed by one (Belgium). Two Member States have recently notified 
measures  which  are  still  under  examination  by  the  Commission's  services  (Greece  and 
Portugal); one Member State has not notified any transposition measures (Italy). 
The New Voice Telephony Directive 98/10/EC is ·substantially transposed into the national 
legislation of ten Member States and partially in three of them (Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Portugal). One Member State recently notified measures which are still under examination by 
the Commission's services (Greece).  One Member State has not notified any transposition 
measures; however, the Old Voice Telephony Directive 95/62/EC is substantially transposed 
there (Italy). 
With regard to the Licensing Directive 97  /13/EC there is national legislation substantially 
transposing  the  Directive  in  twelve  Member  States.  Two  Member  States  have  partially 
23  Except for Article 5, the deadline for which is 24 October 2000. 
24  Excluding the Member States for which extended deadlines for fullliberalisation were granted. 
7 transposed (Belgium and Italy) and one Member State has recently notified measures which 
are still under examination by the Commission's services (Greece). 
The Interconnection Directive 97/33/EC has also been substantially transposed by twelve 
Member States. Two Member States have partially transposed (Belgium and Luxembourg) 
and one Member State has recently notified measures which are  still under examination by 
the Commission's services (Greece). 
The Numbering Directive 98/61/EC, amending the Interconnection Directive 97/33/ECwith 
regard to number portability and carrier pre-selection, is already substantially transposed by 
ten  Member  States  and  partially  transposed  by  three  Member  ~tates (France,  Italy  and 
Finland). One Member State has recently notified measures of transposition  which are still 
under examination by the Commission's services (Greece). With regard to one Member State 
a decision on a request for deferment of the introduction of carrier pre-selection is pending 
(United Kingdom). 
Seven  Member  States  have  substantially  transposed  the  sector-specific  Data Protection 
Directive 97/66/EC  (Germany,  Spain,  Italy,  Austria,  Portugal,  Finland  and  Sweden).  The 
directive is partially transposed by another five Member States (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
The  Netherlands  and  United  Kingdom).  Three  Member  States  have  not  so  far  notified 
transposition measures (Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg). 
The Commission notes the improvements in transposition in particular with regard to 
the Licensing  Directive  (where  four  more  Member  States  have  substantially  transposed 
following  the  Fourth Report)  and the Interconnection Directive  (three Member States), 
together with the fact that thirteen Member States have transposed the Numbering Directive 
substantially or partially and eleven the Data Protection Directive. The Commission urges 
those Member States responsible for the small number of gaps in transposition to take 
the necessary measures rapidly, in  order to secure legal certainty for  market players 
and to  complete  the solid  basis  necessary for  the  future  evolution  of the regulatory 
framework. 
As  regards  the  liberalisation  directives,  Portugal  has  substantially  transposed  Directive 
90/388/EEC  as  amended  by Directive  96/19/EC,  for  which  it  was  granted  an  additional 
implementation  period  by Decision  97/310/EC  of 12  February  1997
25
,  and  has  recently 
notified certain measures, which are still under examination by_ the Commission's services. 
As regards Directive 1999/64/EC of 23  June 1999
26
,  the deadline to  notify implementation 
measures has not yet elapsed, but a number of  Member States have already initiated steps to 
implement  it.  The Commission  is  following  developments  closely  and urges  Member 
States to promote the use of CATV networks to increase competition in the local loop, 
which Is the aim of the Directive. 
15  OJ No L 133, 24.5.1997, p.l9 
16  OJNoL175,10.7.1999,P.39 
8 3.  ANALYSIS  OF  PRACTICAL  APPLICATION  OF  THE  LIBERALISATION  AND 
HARMONISATION DIRECTIVES 
In order to  analyse the  effective application of the current regulatory package,  the Fourth 
Report  identified  eight  key  regulatory  themes:  national  regulatory  authorities,  licensing, 
interconnection, universal service, tariffs, numbering, frequency, rights of  way; in view of its 
importance in the market, an overview was also given of  competition as it is evolving in local 
access.  This section builds on the Fourth Report to assess the practical application of the 
provisions  of the  framework  (overview  set  out  in  Annex  1  ),  grouped  by theme,  in  the 
Member States as  at  1 October 1999. The Commission's assessment, based on the country 
analyses in Annex 3, are set out below; in some cases these vary from those in the Fourth 
Report  not  because  the  national  framework  has  changed  but  because  the  needs  and 
perceptions of  market players have evolved considerably since October 1998. 
National regulatory authorities (NRAs) 
Basis of  assessment 
The national regulatory  authorities  are  the cornerstone of the  application  in the  Member 
States of  virtually the entire regulatory package as currently constituted, and will play a major 
part in framing and applying the revised regulatory framework. They also play an important 
role in ensuring the consistent application of  the EC regulatory framework through their input 
to the ONP and Licensing Committees
27
,  their participation in the High Level Committee of 
National Administrations and Regulatory Authorities and, in the case of regulatory bodies 
separate from national ministries, their coordination in the Independent Regulators Group. 
In assessing the criterion of  independence from operators and structural separation of  the 
regulatory  and  control  functions,  the  Commission  has  examined  not  only  the  formal 
structures put in place, including measures to ensure that officials associated with exercise of 
the regulatory function are not associated with the management of the incumbent, but also 
such factors as the mechanisms by which decisions are taken, their timeliness, the nature of 
the decisions reached, and the extent to which personnel are taken over or seconded from the 
incumbent or other operators. 
The Commission has also examined not only whether NRAs have the necessary powers at · 
their disposal, but whether staff are sufficiently well-qualified to  use them effectively and 
whether other resources, including budgetary, are sufficient. Much also depends on the way 
in which NRAs use their powers,  as  set out in the directives, in a proactive manner,  for 
example to stimulate competitive markets and ensure the fair and proper development of a 
harmonised European telecommunications market.  A further important factor is  the clarity 
with which powers are assigned as between the NRA and other bodies, including ministries 
and the national competition authority, or between the separate regulatory  agency and the 
ministry where the latter is also notified as NRA; too wide a dispersal of regulatory powers 
can  weaken  implementation.  In  some  cases  the  development  of a  coherent  regulatory 
approach to the market as regards for example the relationship between retail tariffs and the 
17  Set up respectively under Article  9 of the Framework Directive 90/387/EEC, OJ L  192, 24.7.1990 and 
Article 14 of  the Licensing Directive 97/13/EC, OJ L 117, 7.5.1997. 
9 underlying interconnection rates may be prejudiced, or the opinion of  the separate regulatory 
agency  may  not  be  given  due  consideration  in  the  absence  of clear  procedures  for 
consultation or coordination between the  authorities  involved.  In  the  final  analysis,  much 
depends on the political support or otherwise that regulators receive from governments; this 
applies equally in Member States where the incumbent is not, or is no longer, State-owned 
but where governments regard the incumbent as the 'national champion'. 
The  Commission's  overall assessment  of the  structure  and functioning  of NRAs is  as 
follows: 
Given the fact  that some Member States set up regulatory authorities well  before 
liberalisation at EC level,  there is  clearly a wide  range of models and experience as 
between  the different Member States.  Nonetheless,  considerable  progress  has  been 
made in those countries which were late in setting up NRAs, and cooperation with 
the Commission and national competition authorities, as  well as  between NRAs in 
the different Member States, has continued at a very satisfactory level. 
Independence from operators/structural separation of  regulatory function from control of 
the incumbent: 
In one case the Minister remains the head of the NRA as  well  as  representing the 
State's  interest  in  the  incumbent  (Belgium).  In  one  Member  State,  the  relevant 
Ministry retains the power to propose the appointment of members of the board of 
the NRA and, along with the Minister of Finance, those members of the board of the 
incumbent representing the State's limited sharcholding (Portugal); in another, the 
ownership  and  regulatory  functions  reside  in  the  same  Ministry,  although  the 
Constitution provides for the independence of the NRA (Sweden).  In one Member 
State (Luxembourg) the Government has nominated as chairman of the incumbent a 
member of the staff of the Ministry responsible for regulation. 
Even  in cases  where formal separation between  the incumbent and the regulatory 
function  is  ensured,  new  entrants  would  seek  to  encourage  a  situation  where 
governments  do  not  intervene  to  safeguard  tbc  interests  of the  incumbent,  in 
particular in cases  where the sale  of the State's shareholding is  in prospect. This is 
. especially the case where regulatory functions arc exercised by departments of those 
Ministries that continue to exercise ownership functions. 
Powers: 
There is a sense among new entrants in a number of Member States that regulators · 
arc not using their full  compctcnccs to combat the usc  by incumbent operators of 
their market power to delay access by engaging in protracted negotiation or failing to 
provide relevant information, or to abuse procedures for that purpose. In some cases, 
a concern was expressed by certain new  entrants that the NRA does  not make the 
most  of its  ability  in  exercising  all  the  powers  assigned  to it (Germany,  Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom). In one Member State, the NRA is  considered by market 
players  to focus  on consumer interests  rather than on the economic  impact of its 
decisions (The Netherlands). 
10 In some cases the NRA appears to have insufficient powers to reach binding decisions 
but rather plays an advisory role (Belgium, Luxembourg). In a number, the market 
would  encourag~ the assignment of fu~er powers  (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece,. France, Austria and Portugal). In one case  (Italy)  although in law  all the 
powers  have  been  transferred to the NRA, it is  reported that it is  not yet  fully 
oper~tional. 
There is a view among new entrants that the allocation of regulatory tasks as between 
ministries  and regulatory agencies  in certain Member States  lacks  clarity,  or that 
powers  are  too  widely  dispersed  (Spain,  France,  Italy,  Austria).  This  is  clearly 
perceived as  working to the advantage of the incumbent. On the other hand some 
measure of coordination is  required in many Member States between the NRA and 
the  national  competition  authorities  (NCA),  in  particular  relating  to  the 
determination of undertakings with significant market power (SMP}.  This may be 
formalised  in  a  protocol  (The  Netherlands)  or  memorandum  of  understanding 
(United Kingdom). No such formalised cooperation appears to exist in some Member 
States (Belgium, Greece, Spain and Austria). In other Member States, varying degrees 
of cooperation are provided for by law (Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Portugal 
and Sweden).  In the case  of Spain,  it appears  that there is  a de  facto  cooperation 
between the NCA and the NRA. Jurisdictional overlaps have been reported in two 
cases  (Ireland  and  Finland)'  and  more  clarity  in  their  relationship  would  be 
encouraged by market players (Luxembourg). 
Increased pro-activity has not always been favoured by the new entrants, especially in 
those segments of the market where competition is viewed as performing well (The 
Netherlands).  However,  in some  Member  States  a  lack  of pro-activity  has  been 
reported (Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Finland). 
Procedures: 
New entrants consider that delays are experienced in reaching decisions by the NRA 
in Germany, Greece, Italy and Sweden. 
~e  effective enforcement of the decisions reached by the NRA could be a concern in 
one case (Austria). A need for further transparency in making decisions is perceived 
by the market in Italy. For some new entrants, over-reliance on information provided 
by the incumbent is seen as an issue (Sweden, United Kingdom). 
In  some  Member  States  the  procedures  for  appealing  against  decisions  by  the 
regulator may create lengthy delays (Denmark, Greece, Austria), or have suspensory 
effect (Ireland). In some cases, such review procedures are also criticised because they 
constitute merely a check on the legality of the original decision without reviewing 
the merits (Ireland, United Kingdom). 
Resources: 
A common problem is  the difficulty of recruiting and retaining staff in a market 
where liberalisation and the rapid take-off of the market, including in some cases the 
market in telecoms equipment, has led to severe skills shortages; one NRA reported 
11 that its average retention of personnel is six months at the executive level. In extreme 
cases the NRA is  staffed partially by personnel on secondment from the incumbent 
operator, who sometimes retain their co~tractuallink, including pension rights. 
Operators reported difficulties experienced by the NRAs in attracting, and in some 
cases  retaining,  well-qualified  personnel  in  Belgium,  Denmark,  Ireland,  The 
Netherlands,  Finland,  Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom,  or  in  obtaining  the 
necessary resources {Greece, Italy). In most cases the NRAs reject this assessment and 
emphasise the quality and integrity of staff. 
Licensing 
Basis of  assessment 
In making its assessment the Commission has  had regard to  the principle laid down in the 
directives  that  licensing  regimes  should  be  light,  favouring  general  authorisations  over 
individual licences. 
Conditions should be published so as to give the fullest possible information to new entrants 
and  to  enable  the  market  to  function  with  the  greatest  possible  degree  of transparency. 
Onerous  conditions  going beyond those permitted  under  the  Licensing  Directive  are  not 
acceptable. 
Procedures should  be transparent  and  light.  Time  limits  for  the  issue  of licences  and 
authorisations should be adhered to  strictly and should not be prolonged by adherence to 
bureaucratic procedures.  Fees should be demonstrably proportionate to  the  administrative 
work involved, and should not be forfeit without justification where the operator in question 
modifies the service provided or withdraws from the market. 
Annex 4 sets out data relating inter alia to numbers of licences issued and fees charged in the 
different Member States. 
The Commission "s overall assessment of  lic~nsing  r~gim~s is as follows: 
There are wide divergences between the national licensing regimes, ranging from the 
lightest  possible,  where  operators  are  free  to  enter the  market  without formality 
{Denmark) or are required simply to register (The Netherlands) or notify {Finland, 
Sweden)  their intention to do  so  {except  where the use  of frequency  spectrum  is 
requested), to the extremely heavy, where individual licences are the rule and in some 
cases a government minister is required to sign every licence. 
In the lightest systems the conditions for the provision of networks or services are 
laid down in the legislation, providing the greatest possible transparency  {Denm~rk, 
Sweden). In others, onerous conditions going far beyond the letter and spirit of the 
directives  are laid down in the licences  themselves,  and in some  cases  are entirely 
confidential as between the issuing authority and the operator concerned. At least one 
regime involves the submission of detailed business plans covering long periods into 
the future {Belgium). Member States with light regimes report minimal problems in 
administering th~,  with maximum benefit to the market and users/  consumers. 
12 Satellite  operators  in  particular  are  concerned  at  the  wide  divergences  in  the 
interpretation in the Member States of the principle that the number of lice~ ·~es may 
be limited only to ensure the efficient u~e of spectrum. · 
The Commission's more specific findings are as follows:· 
Conditions: 
Two Member  States  impose  licence  conditions  going beyond those set  out in  the 
Annex to the Licensing Directive (Belgium, France). In France the condition relating 
to a contribution to research and development is regarded as an entry barrier by new 
entrants, in particular small operators. Satellite operators regretted the fact that little 
use is made of the one-stop shopping possibilities in the Licensing Directive and the S-
PCS Decision. 
Time limits: 
Procedures  are  too  lengthy under the licensing  regimes  of a  number of Member 
States, with complaints that deadlines exceed the six weeks laid down in the Licensing 
Directive (Greece, France for networks, Italy), although in some cases  that target is 
met notwithstanding the non-conformity of the national regulatiDn (Belgium). In the 
case  of Greece  the Licensing  Directive  has  recently  been  transposed.  In Italy  the 
deadlines  for  obtaining satellite  licences  are long and complex.  That country  has, 
however, begun the process for bringing its regulation into line with the directive. In 
Germany, the licensing procedure in most cases  exceeds  six  weeks  in practice,  and 
licences are normally granted only within 2 or 3 months. 
Procedures: 
In  the  majority  of  Member  States  the  procedures  for  granting  licences  appear 
transparent, non discriminatory ·and accessible, with operators praising in general the 
NRAs' transparent approach in the process. Nevertheless the problem remains of at 
least  one  ministry  carrying  out a  second  evaluation  (France)  which,  in  a  certain 
number of cases, can be a source of inconsistent decisions between the two regulatory 
authorities  which  share  responsibility  for  issuing  licences.  This  can  also  lead  to 
excessive delays in issuing licences or a lack of transparency in  those decisions. 
Licensing procedures also appear to be protracted, heavy and lacking in transparency 
in Italy (even  if 61  licences  have  now been  granted), and a clear  set  of rules  and 
conditions has not been established for general authorisations. However, the Italian 
authorities  have  started  reviewing  the licensing  regime  with  a view  inter  alia  to 
simplifying the procedures. 
Fees: 
In three countries (Germany, France, Luxembourg) it appears that fees  and charges 
may be higher than the administrative costs incurred (even if  it should be pointed out 
that there are  large  numbers of operators in the market in Germany and France). 
Furthermore,  potential  new  entrants  consider  that their  level  tends  to  foreclose 
13 market entry. In one country (Luxembourg) the level of fees could be considered high 
compared with the other Member States  in  terms  of population and geographic 
coverage of the licences. 
Even if the directive allows for account to be taken of the need to ensure optimal use 
of scarce resources, licence fees covering allocation of frequencies appear very high in 
one country (Portugal). 
Satellite  operators complain that the level  and structure of fees  vary dramatically 
from one Member State to another. 
Interconnection/special access 
Basis of  assessment 
The  terms  for the provision of interconnection, the physical linking of (fixed and  mobile) 
networks and services so as to enable users of  one to communicate with those of another, or 
to  access  services provided over another,  are  of crucial  importance to  the emergence of a 
competitive European telecommunications market. 
The Commission's assessment takes into account the problems faced by many new entrants 
in  obtaining interconnection with incumbent operators,  in particular as  regards protracted 
negotiations and lengthy delivery times and including outright refusal to interconnect. 
The level of tariffs is of particular importance in a competitive market, with unjustifiably 
high  tariffs  in  certain  Member  States,  as  weil  as  relatively  high  interconnection  tariffs 
combined with low end-user tariffs tending to foreclose market entry. The provision of non-
discriminatory tariffs, irrespective of the pwpose for  which interconnection is  required,  is 
important to eliminate distortions of  competition. 
Late  production  and,  where  required  by  national  law,  approval  of  the  reference 
interconnection offer (RIO) by the NRA is  an important factor in delaying new  market 
entry.  RIOs  should  not  set  out  offerings  which  do  not  meet  the  market  needs  of other 
operators, or which preclude the provision of  services already offered by the originator of  the 
RIO, or which bundle services so that new entrants are obliged to pay for services they do not 
wish to purchase, rendering the services they do  offer uneconomic. Moreover, in the event 
that an  NRA or other national  authorities approve or impose tariffs that may reinforce or 
promote anti-competitive behaviour, the Member States themselves are potentially infringing 
the EU competition rules, and may be held liable for this. 
The  imposition by incumbent  operators  of onerous  requirements  relating  to  the  network 
architecture of interconnecting parties should not be allowed to foreclose market entry by 
forcing new entrants to duplicate capacity unnecessarily. 
The  NRAs  are  given  extensive  competences  under  the  directives  to  supervise  the 
interconnection market, including the power to set ex ante conditions, amend RIOs, impose 
tariff amendments,  intervene of their own initiative in  interconnect~on disputes,  scrutinise 
interconnection agreements, and supervise cost accounting and separation. The NRAs should 
14 use these powers to the full extent necessary to ensure interconnection in the interests of all 
users. 
Annex 4 sets out data relating inter alia to the number of  interconnection agreements in place, 
the level of  tariffs for call termination, and deviation from best current practice. 
The Commission's overall assessment of  interconnection regimes is as follows: 
The greatest single problem facing new entrants in obtaining interconnection on fair 
terms  is  cited as  being the reluctance,  or lack  of empowerment,  of regulators  to 
intervene in a forceful,  timely and effective manner. As  a result, new entrants are 
faced  in  many  instances  with  RIOs  that  are  published  late  or  which  contain 
unsatisfactory offerings, delays in negotiating terms and unacceptable delivery times. 
Many interconnection agreements contain asymmetric  conditions  in favour  of the 
incumbent  relating,  for  example,  to penalties.  A  further  major  problem  is  that 
supervision by the NRAs of cost-accounting systems for interconnection is  in many 
cases  not adequate, in terms either of the regulation or procedures in place or the 
wide variation in tariffs charged throughout the single market. As a result the cost-
orientation  of the interconnection  and retail  tariffs  of SMP  operators  cannot be 
verified. In parti~ular, price squeezes resulting from high interconnection tariffs and 
low end-user tariffs have the effect in a number of Member States of foreclosing entry 
in various market segments. 
Intervention by NRAs: 
In  some Member States where the problem of obtaining interconnection on fair terms 
has been raised in the past (Denmark, Italy, Portugal), the situation has improved in 
the_ course of the year, but the lack of pro-activity or authority by the regulator with 
regard to interconnection conditions remains a significant concern in Belgium, and to 
a  lesser  extent  in  Finland.  Procedural  delays  in finalising  the publication  of an 
effective  RIO,  especially  as· a·  consequence  of  judicial  reviews  initiated  by  the 
incumbent  operators,  are  also  an objective  impediment  to the liberalisation  pace. 
Only in very few  Member States {Sweden, United Kingdom) can it be said that the 
Reference  Interconnection Offer and the interconnection facilities  are consistently 
offered by the incumbents on a timely basis and meet the reasonable expectations of 
new entrants. 
The  publication  of interconnection  agreements  is  intended  to facilitate  access  to 
information;  in  practice  incumbents  often  invoke  confidentiality  clauses  or  the 
protection of business secrets before the NRA. Additional difficulties may arise where 
the incumbent requires expensive and lengthy pre-tests, or may impose heavy penalty 
clauses in the arrangements negotiated. 
Technical conditions: 
The technical  conditions  for  interconnection,  including  the provision  of adequate 
capacity and the points of interconnection (Pols}  available or mandated, have been 
reported by new entrants as  a substantial source  of practical  difficulties,  cost  and 
delay. It is, moreover,- often difficult for new entrants to obtain accurate information 
15 from the incumbents concerning the location of switches and their capabilities, and 
about the quality of service  which they may rely  upon. The timely availability of 
infrastructure capacity, in terms of leased lines or convenient Pols, is reported to be 
problematic in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, The Netherlands, Austria, and 
Finland. 
National  regulatory  regimes,  or decisions  by  the  regulator,  sometimes  appear  to 
impose  disproportionate obligations on interconnecting parties with  regard to the 
number of points of interconnection they are required to provide. A solution to this 
problem has however started to emerge in Germany. In Belgium and Spain, where 
licensing of network operators is linked to infrastructure roll-out conditions, there is 
a potential for the NRA to impose disproportionate requirements with regard to the 
location and number of Pols new entrants must provide. The same Member States 
limit the right of new entrants to obtain double tandem interconnection, with the 
objective  of  encouraging  investment  in  infrastructure  and  limiting  risks  of 
overloading  the incumbent  network from  an  interconnection  point at local  level 
which was not designed to absorb nationwide traffic. Although these concerns are not 
in contradiction with specific provisions of the EC regulatory framework, they raise 
the issue  of the proportionality of the requirements  which  may  be  laid  down  as 
against the distortion of competition they may provoke. 
Direct access to space segment: 
In most Member States, direct access to EUTELSAT and INTELSAT space segment is 
still not permitted by the respective Conventions. The process of privatisation of both 
organisations,  to  be  completed  by  the  end  of 2001,  should  however  provide  a 
definitive solution to the problem of lack of multiple access.  In the meanwhile, the 
majority  of  Member  States  have  been  addressing  the  issue  by  means  of  side 
agreements  permitting direct  access  in  their countries.  These  agreements  involve 
eight  Member  States  (Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  France,  The  Netherlands, 
Austria, Sweden and United Kingdom) in the case of EUTELSAT and eleven Member 
States  (Denmark,  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Ireland,  The  Netherlands,  Austria, 
Portugal,  Finland,  Sweden  and  United  Kingdom)  in  the  case  of  INTELSAT. 
However, representatives of the satellite industry reported that in most cases it is still 
necessary to purchase satellite capacity via the local signatory, with fees to be paid to 
the signatory varying between approximately 5 to 20% (for INTELSAT) and 5 to 10% 
(for EUTELSAT) of the space segment cost. 
Universal service and user/consumer  protection 
Basis of  assessment 
The interests of users and consumers are  at the heart of the  liberalisation and  single market 
process in that the fundamental objective of the EC regulatory package is to  secure a choice of 
operators  and  services,  and  lower tariffs.  The universal  service requirement exists in  the EU 
framework to allow Member States to ensure that a minimum set of  services, of specified quality 
and an affordable price, are made available to all users. 
16 As  far  as  the  sector-specific  regulation  relating  to  universal  service  and  users/consumers  is 
concerned,  the  Commission  has  examined  in  particular  the  universal  service  funding 
mechanisms  whi_ch  currently  exist,  the  role  of NRAs,  which  once  again  bear  a  large 
responsibility  for  applying  the  concepts  laid  down  in  the  framework  in  relation  to 
users/consumers, and the main practical problems facing new entrants, users and consumers. 
The Commission
1s overall assessment of  universal service and u.ser/consumer protection is 
as follows: 
Universal service funding: 
The provision of universal service does not appear to be creating an undue burden on the 
designated operators in the Member States. This is evidenced by the fact that, while nine 
Member  States  (Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Netherlanris, 
Austria and Portugal) have  introduced legal provisions for a universal service  fundin~ 
mechanism, only two of these (France, Italy) have been put into operation. Furthermore, 
only in France has this actually resulted in payment transfers between operators. 
New entrants in those countries where a funding mechanism has been set up, or where 
the prospect of such a fund exists, regard funding as  a supplementary tax on revenues 
and therefore a barrier to entry, as well as being bureaucratic and likely to distort the 
market. In France, the level  of the costs which are to. be  recouped under the funding 
mechanism,  and  the  method  of  calculating  them,  are  regarded  by ·  new  entrants  as 
creating  distortions  in  the  market.  This  could  also  be  the  case  in  Belgium.  The 
uncertainty about future liabilities, and the fact that the funding mechanism may  be 
triggered in a number of Member States once certain market conditions are fulfilled, 
undermines the business planning and fmancial stability of new entrants. 
New  entrants consider  that  it is  for  governments  to fund  social  obligations  out of 
general taxation, as  is the norm in other economic sectors. Moreover, in some Member 
States or geographical areas of Member States, competitive mobile markets arc moving 
towards providing access at costs that arc comparable to, or even lower than, the fixed . 
universal service. 
In m'ost Member States, there is little evidence that voice telephony tariffs applied by the 
incumbents have actually been rebalanced, in particular when looking at monthly rental 
fees charged by incumbents, and that appropriate cost-accounting systems are in place to 
verify  this.  Where  tariffs  are  fully  re-balanced,  affordability  of universal  service  can 
usually be achieved by low usage schemes. 
Consumerslu.sers 
The greatest  problems  affecting  consumers  appear to be  the lack  of transparency  in 
tariffs and in service information, and the need to establish efficient and rapid complaint 
handling  and  redress  mechanisms.  A  number  of Member  States  arc  now  creating 
mechanisms  for  dealing  with  problems  which  consumers  experience,  particularly  in 
relation  to  contracts and  quality  of service.  However,  there ·is  very  little  systematic 
monitoring of quality of service  indicators  by the NRAs,  and this  in tum makes  it 
harder to monitor the effective achievement of universal access  and affordability. It is 
17 clear  that  the  regular  publication  in  the  Member  States  of  independently  verified 
indicators would, in itself, improve both competition and consumer choice. 
A special problem is the absence of transparency in the tariff offerings of new entrants, 
who regularly modify both tariffs and the structure of offerings, which differ widely 
from one operator to the other, thus making comparisons difficult for consumers. New 
entrants defend their behaviour by pointing out that they have on the one hand to react 
to changes in the incumbents' offerings, and on the other to the fact that they do not 
have the market profile or publicity budgets of the incumbents. In addition, contract 
terms  can  sometimes  include  unfair clauses,  which  are  incompatible  with  horizontal 
Community legislation (e.g. clauses that oblige consumers to ~tay with an operator for a 
minimum ftxed time, which contravene the Unfair Contract Terms Directive). A further 
major difficulty for consumers is billing, which accounts for the majority of complaints 
to regulators. 
Consumers are also concerned that the existing competition in national and local services 
in many Member States extends only to business and not residential customers. The lack 
of effective competition in the local loop targeted to residential users is having a negative 
impact on the level of fixed charges and local call charges. 
Another potential problem for consumers may arise with the analogue phase-out in the 
900 MHz band driven by the extension of GSM. Consumers in the mobile market may 
be faced with the prospect of their analogue handsets becoming obsolete. Experience in 
some Member States shows, however, that operators have found market-based solutions 
that do not disadvantage consumers. 
From a user perspective, there are very significant concerns about the effects of the cost 
of leased  lines  in  Europe,  including  cross-border  leased  lines.  The  failure  both  of 
competition and of regulators to bring down what are perceived to be patently non-cost 
oriented tariffs works to the detriment of the provision of Internet and other services in 
Europe. This in turn is 'to the detriment of user access  and choice,  in particular with 
respect to news-gathering and market data services. 
112 
The 112 European emergency number is available throughout the Union
21
,  although in 
many Member States a response is given only in the language of the country or region in 
which the call  is  made.  A barrier to free  movement resides  in the fact  that although 
consumers in most Member States are aware that they can use the number in their own 
country, many of them are not informed that they can also use it .when visiting other 
Member States. 
21  With the exception of  the incumbent in Greece. 
18 Tariffs/accounting systems 
Basis of  assessment 
The Commission has examined whether restrictions remain on tariff rebalancing, apart from 
the measures permitted in the context of  universal service provision. PSTN (public switched 
telephony network), leased line and interconnection tariffs, where offered by SMP operators, 
should be c:ost oriented, with suitable c:ost-ac:c:ounting systems in place, the methodology 
verified,  information on cost-accounting systems published, and compliance with the cost 
accounting system verified py NRAs or other competent independent bodies. 
Annex 4 sets out data inter alia on tariffs for leased lines, interconnection and PSTN. 
The Commission's overall assessment of  the application of  tariff  principles is as foUows: 
Tariff rebalancing: 
Liberalisation has produced significant tariff reductions leading to convergence of call 
charges towards actual cost. This results from the fact that, in the long-distance and 
international  voice  telephony  markets,  competing  operators  have  been  able  to 
undercut the incumbents' tariffs, which were characterised by artificially high prices 
in order to cross-subsidise their regulated below-cost charges for access and local calls. 
Data show that international tariffs have decreased over the period from 1997 to 1999, 
to the benefit of both residential and business users, by 40% and 25% respectively. In 
general  terms,  most  Member  States  claim  that  tariffs  have  been  rebalanced  and 
consider that the .  process  of progressive  adj~stment of tariffs toward costs  ~as been 
completed. 
The Member States  which  still  benefit from  additional  periods  to implement full 
competition (Greece  and  Portugal)  were  expressly  granted  such  periods  by  the 
Commission  to  allow  for  the  necessary  structural  adjustments.  Both  countries 
consider that tariff rebalancing will be concluded by the introduction of competition 
in the voice telephony market, although a detailed timetable has not been laid down 
beforehand. 
With regard to the countries where the market was opened to full competition in 1998 
or earlier, in several cases market operators have expressed doubts as to whether the 
tariff rebalancing process has actually been completed. In most Member States it is, in 
fact, not possible to determine whether subscriber tariffs are in compliance with. the 
principle of cost-orientation, or to demonstrate that tariffs for local services are at a 
level at which they could be provided by new entrants; the same could also be argued 
with regard to the price ·of line rental when compared to the actual costing of the 
incumbent. Nevertheless, at present no Access Deficit Scheme is implemented in any 
Member State. The investigation in the local loop area which the Commission opened 
in July 1999 should enable the Commission to assess the actual level of rebalancing of 
tariffs achieved in the Member States, based on the incumbents' accounting data. It is 
essential that tariff rebalancing is fully completed as, in particular, tariffs kept at too 
low a level in the local market act as a disincentive to new entrants and do not allow 
them to find a reasonable profit margin between the retail tariff of the incumbent and 
19 the corresponding interconnection charges,  with  resulting price  squeeze  effects  or 
disincentives to investment in alternative local loop infrastructure. 
Lack  of .  clarity in  the control of end-user  tariffs  by the NRA  is  reported in two 
· countries (France, Luxembourg) and in some countries tariff transparency appears to 
be lacking (France), with particular regard to discounts offered to large business users 
(in particular Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria). 
With the aim  of maintaining the affordability  of services  or controlling prices,  a 
number of Member  States  have· decided  to introduce  price  cap  mechanisms  until 
competition can 'provide effective  price control over the incumbent's  retail  tariffs. 
However, in some Member States price caps were introduced before the adjustment of 
tariffs to costs had been completed. 
Cost accounting: 
In general terms, cost accounting remains a problematic issue in a large number of 
Member States. There is in fact little evidence in most of them that cost accounting 
principles are correctly applied. In several countries the NRA has  not yet approved 
the cost  accounting  system  of the incumbent (Belgium,  Germany,  Greece,  Spain, 
Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Austria,  Portugal)  and  therefore  it cannot  be  ascertained 
whether  a  suitable  cost-accounting  system  is  in  place  for  costing  the  services  in 
question  (voice  telephony,  interconnection,  leased  lines,  etc.).  Significant 
improvement  has  taken  place  in Greece  since  the  Fourth Report,  where  a  cost-
accounting system for leased lines has been approved for the fmt time. A number of 
Member  States  are  said  to be  working actively  on their systems,  but the lack  of 
progress causes  a serious gap in verification of the effective implementation of the 
regulatory framework. In several Member States, the cost accounting system of the 
incumbent  is  reported  to  lack  transparency  (Germany,  Spain,  Austria,  Finland, 
Sweden)  in  particular  for  providing  cost  data  regarding  specific  access  elements 
(Belgium). Accounting separation is  not sufficiently strict and is  a source of general 
concern, as  is  the related risk of cross-subsidisation between the different operating 
arms of the former monopolist. 
Leased lines: 
There have in the past been great concerns on the part of users regarding excessive 
pricing of leased  lines,  including international leased  lines;  the latter constitutes a 
barrier to the emergence of a single market for telecommunications services. There is 
evidence, however, that competition is now bringing tariffs down for certain services. 
There are problems with regard to the transparency of leased line tariffs (Belgium as 
regards discounts, Italy, Luxembourg), the pricing methodology (Finland), and the 
conditions  granted  to  large  customers  by  the  incumbent  (Belgium,  France, 
Lux~bourg). In a large number of countries there are concerns in relation to the 
correct  application  of the  principle  of cost-orientation  for  leased  lines,  as  also 
evidenced by market data (Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg,  Austria,  Portugal;  and  Finland,  Sweden,  United  Kingdom  for 
international leased lines). In Greece this refers to the situation before the adoption of 
the new  cost  accounting  system  for  leased  lines.  In both Sweden  and the United 
20 Kingdom concerns have been reported with regard to other particular types of leased 
lines  (digital  X-line  and  'last  mile'  respectively)  and the respective  regulators  are 
looking into the issue. In a few countries there are still problems in obtaining·Ieased 
lines, and delays are reported which could also be due to scarcity problems (Belgium, 
The Netherlands). The investigation relating to the provision of leased lines that the 
Commission opened in July 1999 should enable the Commission to assess whether the 
situation observed derives from anti-competitive practices. 
Numbering 
Basis of  assessment 
The  Commission  has  examined  whether  numbering  plans  have  been published,  whether 
effective management of. the plans is separated from  the incumbent operator, and whether 
mobile operators in particular have sufficient numbers made available to them. 
As regards number portability and carrier pre-selection, the Commission has examined the 
scope of  the services Member States have put, or are planning to put, into operation and the 
timing of  the completion of  their obligations under the Numbering Directive29• 
The Commission's overall assessment in relation to numbering is as follofiJs: 
There  are  concerns  on  the  part  of  virtually. all  market  players  regarding  the 
introduction of number portability and carrier pre-selection. The solutions adopted 
for  the  introduction  of  both  services  involve  administrative  arrangements  and 
network  reconfigurations  of varying  degrees  of complexity,  that are  difficult  to 
manage. The costs  involved have  in some cases  proved to be relatively  high,  and 
definitive decisions have not yet been taken in all Member States as to how the costs 
are  to  be  apportioned  as  between  the  operators  involved  and the  end-customer. 
Furthermore, some operators have claimed that the introduction of these services at 
1 January  2000  has  been  complicated  by the  risks  associated  with  that date  for 
networks and IT installations. The Commission is  however encouraged by the fact 
that these services are already in place in a number of Member States and that others 
have indicated that they are on target for the prescribed date. 
Number portability: 
Operator number portability is applied ahead of the deadline of 1 January 2000
30 in 
seven Member States: Germany, France, Netherlands (geographic and non-geographic 
for  fixed  and  mobile  operators),  Austria  (within  a  geographical  area  by  call 
forwarding),  Finland  (within  a  numbering  area  and  for  nation-wide  numbers), 
Sweden (geographic and some non-geographic numbers) and the United Kingdom. In 
Denmark,  number portability  within  the same  geographical  area  was  due  to be 
introduced by 15 October 1999. 
29  Directive 98/61/EC amending Directive 97/33/EC with regard to operator number portability and carrier 
pre-selection, OJ L 286, 3.10.1998. 
30  Deadline in the case of derogation countries is not later than two years following the introduction of full 
liberalisation. 
21 Carrier pre-selection: 
Four Member States  have  introduced carrier pre-selection ahead  of the  1 January 
2000
32  deadline:  Denmark (since  1 January 1999),  Germany (since  1 January 1998), 
Finland (for long distance calls since 1 January 1994, for international calls from ftxed 
networks since 30  September 1998 and for international calls from mobile networks 
since 1 January 1999) and Sweden (since September 1999). The United Kingdom has 
requested  a  deferment  of  its  obligations  under  the  directive  as  regards  the 
introduction of carrier pre-selection. 
Numbering plans: 
New numbering plans have been adopted in all Member States except Greece. Their 
management falls within the competences of the NRA in all Member States. 
Frequency 
Basis of  assessment 
The Commission has examined under this heading in particular whether use of  the 900 MHz 
band  for  analogue  mobile  services  is  being  phased  out  in  accordance  with  commercial 
demand for GSM (digital) services; whether all  frequencies  have been allocated for  GSM, 
paging  and  c.ordless  telephony  services;  whether  licences  are  issued  in  all  cases  where 
frequency  · is  available;  and  whether  assignment  procedures  are  transparent,  non-
discriminatory and efficient.  · 
The  Commission~s overall assessment in relation to frequency is as follows:  . 
There are very few complaints or concerns relating to frequency management in the 
Member States in the context of the GSM,  DECT and ERMES  Directives.  Many 
Member States are currently in the process  of issuing licences  for third generation 
mobile and for wireless local loop applications, and more specific comments are set 
out below. Several ministries and regulators drew attention during the preparation of 
the Report to the fact that frequency auctions can represent a hindrance to the roll-
out of infrastructure and will tend to lead to higher end-customer tariffs, leading in 
turn to slower growth and a disbenefit  to the wider economy.  Others passed  the 
strong message that mechanisms for placing value on spectrum, including auctions, 
represent an efficient tool for managing spectrum. 
Phase-out of  analogue: 
In the great majority of Member States there is a time limit in place for the phasing 
out of the analogue system operating in the frequency bands reserved for GSM.  In 
some cases this time limit seems to be longer than would correspond to commercial 
demand (Denmark, Italy, Austria, Finland, Sweden, although in the latter two cases 
at least the incumbent has committed to phase out by end 2000). However, phase-out 
22 is  being brought forward in a number of Member States from the dates specified in 
the Frequency Reportu. 
Frequency management: 
There is  in principle no lack  of frequency reported in Belgium,  Denmark, Greece, 
Spain, France, The Ne.therlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. Frequency plans exist in most Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Spain, 
France, Italy, The Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom). In the 
other Member States (Germany, Greece, Luxembourg) there is strong demand for the 
establishment of a frequency  allocation  plan in order to ensure transparent, non-
discriminatory and efficient management of the spectrum. Spectt:Um management is 
not efficient in relation to the scarcity of this resource and the rapidly expanding 
demand for mobile systems in Italy. 
Satellite operators expressed concern at the wide variations between Member States in 
the way in which spectrum is managed, allocated and assigned
32
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The  necessary  bandwidths  have  been  reserved  and allocated  to GSM  and DECT 
according  to  the  relevant  directives  in  all  Member  States.  Nevertheless  in  some 
Member States transparency is still lacking (Italy, Luxembourg). All Member States 
have issued at least two licences for GSM 900 and at least one for DCS-1800. 
Concerns as  regards the monitoring of spectrum exists in one country {Greece) and 
can be considered as a major barrier to market operations. 
Issuing of  licences for third generation and wireless local loop: 
Only Finland has so far granted licences for third generation mobile networks (March 
1999). Licences are expected to be granted in Denmark and The Netherlands in 2000, 
and licensing is  planned to start in Sweden in 2000.  In the United Kingdom, third 
generation mobile services are to be offered in 2002. Belgium, Spain, France, Italy and 
Austria have launched public consultations on the introduction of third generation 
systems. 
Most Member States except Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg have initiated procedures 
to  allocate  frequencies  for  wireless  local  loop,  or experimental  licences  (Belgium, 
France, Sweden). In Austria no specific licence is required. 
31  COM(l998) 559. 
32  Concern was  voiced in particular that  the  current level of hannonisation achieved by means of CEPT 
decisions is  insufficient:  for  instance, only  10 Member States have adopted CEPT/ERCIDEC (97)03 on 
spectrum use for  S-PCS; in addition only five  Member States have adopted CEPT/ERCIDEC (97)07 on 
spectrum use for UMTS. 
23 Rights of  way 
Basis of  assessment 
The Commission has examined whether problems have arisen in practice in obtaining rights 
of way aeross public and private land, whether there is  discrimination between operators, 
whether disputes have arisen in connection with facility sharing, and whether problems have 
arisen in connection with the landing of  undersea cables and the associated backhaul. 
The  Commission's  overall  assessment  in  relation  to  rights  of  way/facility 
sharing/undersea cables is as follows: 
There is  no uniform approach to the question of rights of way  given that in most 
Member  States  the  relevant  competences  are  in  the  hands  of  local  or  regional 
authorities rather than central government. Other areas of law may also be involved, 
such  as  planning and environmental law  and building  regulations,  with complex 
historical precedents also playing a role. 
Colocation in ducts, buildings, and masts/  antennae represents a real problem for new 
entrants and incumbents alike, which are complicated by aesthetic,  environmental, 
physical (e.g. lack of high buildings) and other factors, including building and town-
planning regulation. 
There is concern ·in a number of Member States that the incumbent operator uses its 
power to delay negotiation where there are no alternative infrastructures. There are 
also  cases  where  ownership  by  the  incumbent  of  cabling  in  office  buildings  or 
apartment blocks creates access bottlenecks. 
Incumbent operators on the other hand are wary of allowing competitors access  to 
facilities of this nature because of the perceived risks to cables and installations. The 
regulators in some Member States have been active in promoting creative solutions in 
particular in the mobile sector involving the shared use of masts and antennae owned 
by public authorities.  · 
Rights of  way: 
All Member States have established a regulatory framework providing for rights of 
way on a non-discriminatory basis. In one country (Luxembourg) it is currently being 
examined whether, in practice, the incumbent is  granted more favourable  rights of 
way than new entrants. 
The granting of public rights of way is not made subject to payment in six Member 
States {Denmark,  Germany,  Luxembourg,  Austria,  Finland, United Kingdom).  In 
two countries {France, Italy) the amount of the payment may vary substantially due 
to the fact that it is set at local level. In a further country (Belgium), while the federal 
telecommunications law provides for free rights of way over public property, certain 
local  authorities  claim  that this  issue  falls  within  their  competence.  As  a  result, 
pending a legal solution, new entrants do not pay for rights of way.  In one further 
24 country (The Netherlands) it is not always clear whether an additional local fee will 
be charged for the placing of antennae. 
In three countries {Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands) operators can start works 
without significant delay, i.e., between six weeks and three months, and no problems 
have  been reported in two further countries (Austria, Finland).  In four countries 
{Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg) the delays are considered to be long, reportedly 
due partially to co-digging rules and to rules against reopening of the public way 
{Italy, Luxembourg), or due to extensive use of powers by local authorities as regards 
environmental  concerns  and encouragement  of colocation  {France,  Italy)  and,  in 
addition, administrative difficulties, such as the involvement of a number of public 
services and the difficulties experienced in co-ordinating them {Greece, Italy). In one 
country {Spain)  the delays  may  vary  substantially but no detailed  data could  be 
collected as to the time limits applied, nor was this possible as regards the remaining 
five countries {Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom). 
In thirteen countries {Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, 
Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom) there is a clear 
framework  establishing  the  respective  competences  for  granting  rights  of  way. 
However, in one of those countries {Belgium) although the legislation is clear, certain 
local  authorities consider  that they  have  competence beyond  that of the federal 
Government  and  this  is  leading  to  problems . in  practice.  In. a  further  country 
{Austria)  no  specific  authorisation  is  needed: ·There  are  problems  on  clarity  of 
competences reported as regards one country (Luxembourg). 
No concern has been reported from any Member State as to whether access to private 
land is ensured. 
Facility sharing: 
There  is  facility  sharing  with  the  incumbents  fixed  network  in  ten  countries 
{Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, 
Finland, United Kingdom). However, in three of those countries (France, Sweden, 
United Kingdom), facility sharing is  not granted on a compulsory basis; as  regards 
one further country {Germany), concern has been expressed about claims regarding 
the incumbent's capacity constraints. In one country {Denmark) facility sharing for 
fixed networks is not compulsory. In a further country (Greece) the incumbent grants 
facility sharing only to its mobile subsidiary. 
Facility  sharing  by  mobile  network  operators  is  ensured  in  ten Member  States 
{Belgium,  Denmark, Spain,  France,  Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal, Finland). 
Undersea cables: 
As regards access to sea cable head-ends, no problems have been reported as  regards 
four countries {Belgium, France, The Netherlands, Finland). In two further countries 
{Denmark, Germany), access to sea cables is granted as a result of regulatory action. 
In two countries (Spain, Italy), the issue is not regulated. 
25 Local access competition 
While unbundled access to the local loop, to allow new entrants to use the existing subscriber 
line to access the end-customer, is not exp.licitly mandated by the harmonisation directives, 
· there is a growing realisation in a number of  Member States that local loop unbundling (LLU) 
is necessary in order to introduce competition at local level, while others are considering it. 
Given cost constraints, unbundling is in many cases important to new entrants in particular to 
enable them to make use of  xDSL
33  technologies to give their customers access to broadband 
services, in particular the Internet. Decisions on unbundling, in particular the tariff set, will 
have an influence on operators' investment plans. Decisions on unbundling may also depend 
on the  level  of competition provided  via TV  cables  or wireless  local  loop  applications. 
Account should also be taken of  the fact that problems remain with digging in relation to the 
roll-out oflocal infrastructure. Generally, however, at present neither cable TV networks nor 
wireless local loop (WLL) are widely used as a practical alternative for local access. Not only 
technical issues, but also the question whether or not the incumbent fixed operator still owns 
or controls key TV cable interests is of  obvious relevance here. 
The  following  is  an  overview  of the  current  situation  in  the  Member  States  regarding 
competition in the access network: 
An  increasing  number  of Member  States  (Denmark,  Germany,  Italy,  The  Netherlands, 
Austria, Finland) have decided to impose local loop unbundling. In Italy, The Netherlands 
and Austria, LLU is however not yet operational. Testing is under way in The Netherlands 
and in Italy a decision by the NRA on the determination of the conditions for LLU, which 
have been subject to a consultation for the past ten months, is expected before the end of 
1999. 
In a  number of countries a  decision on LLU  is  still  under consultation (France,  Ireland, 
United  Kingdom).  In  Sweden,  a  proposal  enabling  compulsory  LLU  through  licensing 
conditions is being assessed by the Govemmenf". In Belgium, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg 
and Portugal there are not yet plans to. unbundle the local infrastructure in the short term. 
Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and Portugal claim that this measure would not be necessary 
due  to  the  availability  of alternative  infrastructure,  in  particular  CATV  networks  of 
competing undertakings, and as regards Spain and Portugal, the granting of  WLL licences. 
In most Member States, services via ADSL technology are being offered, but only by the 
incumbent, and without there being an obligation on the incumbent to offer access to other 
market players. In Germany, Spain and Finland, services via ADSL are also being offered by 
new entrants.  In Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal, there are currently no ADSL services 
being offered, in The Netherlands and Austria there is a pilot for ADSL. The Italian NRA is 
assessing the possibility of  including the ADSL service among the different options for local 
access. According to recent information the NRA in the United Kingdom intends to ensure 
that, when the incumbent upgrades its local loop to provide ADSL, wholesale products will 
be made  available  to  other  operators  so  that  they  can  offer  similar  services  over  the 
33  Digital subscnber line systems providing high speed access over existing copper cables. 
34  In the framework of the notification of their envisaged merger, Telia!Telenor made the commitment to 
implement a set of  measures to introduce LLU. 
26 incumbents  network.  In France  it has  been  announced  that  there  are  plans  to  offer new 
entrants access to the incumbent's ADSL services. 
Another means of increasing competition in the last mile is the wireless local loop (WLL). 
In most Member States, licences have either been granted (Germany, Spain, Ireland, Portugal 
-operational 1 January 2000, Finland and the United Kingdom), or consultations are under 
way. In Spain two licences for wireless local access have been granted to new entrants, and 
the authorities have recently launched an invitation to tender for the issue of  six new licences. 
In Austria a licence is not needed; the frequency assignment is expected soon. In Denmark, 
France  and  The  Netherlands,  licences  will  be  granted  in  2000,  in  France  experimental 
licences have been granted in the meantime. In Sweden there are also temporary trials at the 
moment, but no application for a permanent licence has yet been made. Test licences are also 
granted  in  Belgium,  where  draft  legislation  is  in preparation  in order to  grant definitive 
licences. A timetable has however not been indicated, which is also the case for Luxembourg. 
In Italy a consultation is planned for the end of 1999. In Greece there are no plans to grant 
licences for the wireless local access network. 
Cable TV (CATV) networks are also a viable alternative local infrastructure, in particular 
where they are not owned or controlled by the incumbent, and an incentive to invest in the 
upgrading necessary to make CATV infrastructure suitable for telecommunications purposes 
therefore exists. In Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, television cable penetration is 
as  high as  that of the voice  telephony network.  In most other countries,  cable television 
networks are present, mostly with coverage at the local level in urban/high density areas. In 
Belgium,  Spain,  The Netherlands,  Austria  and  the  United  Kingdom,  voice telephony via 
cable is actually being offered, even though large parts of  the population are not being offered 
voice telephony services yet. The fact that cable operators tend to use cable for the provision 
of Internet  access  (data)  rather  than  for  voice  telephony  is  one  of the  reasons  for  The 
Netherlands to decide in favour of LLU, as  only two cable operators (covering 25% of the 
population)  are  actually  offering  local  calls,  although  cooperation  between  four  cable 
operators has been announced, which would lead to  a coverage of approximately 70%. The 
provision of voice telephony via cable is currently not offered, or offered only at  a very 
limited  level,  in  Denmark,  Germany,  Greece,  France,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Portugal, 
Finland, and Sweden. In Italy, cable TV penetration is close to zero. In Ireland, following the 
recent privatisation of  a cable company, competition in the access network is developing. 
4.  STATUS OF THE EU TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES MARKET 
The assessment given above of the status of the transposition of the regulatory package and 
application in practice of the principles laid down is reflected in the market data set out in 
Annex 4. In broad terms, it is clear that the liberalised regimes in place in the Member States 
are driving growth in all sectors of  the market, large increases in market entry, a doubling of 
the  number  of interconnection  agreements  for  call  termination  in  fixed  networks,  large 
decreases  in  particular  for  long-distance  and  international  call  tariffs,  and  significant 
decreases in the cost of national and international leased lines, in particular for· digital leased 
line services. However, the cost to residential consumers of  national calls has remained stable 
over the past two years, and only small reductions have been recorded for business users. In 
addition,  comparisons of the  cost  of leased  line  services  between  Member States  reveal 
differences  which  can  only  be  attributable  to  a  lack  of cost  orientation  in  many  cases. 
27 Furthermore, a comparison of the cost of international half-circuits with the cost of national 
long-distance lines shows the former to be significantly overpriced. 
Telecommunlctdions services market 
The telecommunications services market in the Member States  (voice  telephony,  mobile, 
switched data and leased line services) is growing both in terms of  value and of  the number of 
subscribers, at a forecast average rate of  just over 6.5% in 1999
35
• 
Although mature, the voice telephony market for  1999 is forecast to  grow in value by an 
average  4.6%  in · relation  to  last  year.  Furthermore,  although  the  provision  of basic 
telecommunications services has in large part been accomplished in all Member States, the 
number of  fixed lines per 100 inhabitants is still growing, probably driven by the demand for 
second residential lines and Internet connectivity through ISDN. 
The moblle market continues to grow rapidly, with its value likely to increase by an average 
15.7% in 1999, and the average penetration rate reaching 36% in August 1999 from  18% in 
August 1998. In some countries the number of  mobile subscribers is comparable to that for 
the fixed service. 
Network services (switched  data and  leased  lines)  are  forecast  to  grow  this  year by an 
average 8.6%, while Internet services, which are still characterised by wide variations in 
penetration  rates  in the  Member  States,  are  nonetheless  spreading  at  a  very  rapid  rate: 
estimates  based  on the  number of Internet hosts  per  1000  inhabitants  show  an  average 
increase by about 125% over the period January 1998-July 1999. 
Fixed voice telephony market 
During the period August 1998 to August 1999, the number of  operators authorised to offer 
fixed telephone services to  the public increased dramatically. More than 260 licences were 
granted during that period,  and the number of authorised operators per million inhabitants 
grew from  1.7 to 2.5. The following is the total number of operators now actually offering 
services: 223  in the local call market; 244 in the long-distance call market (compared with 
195 in 1998); 280 in the international call market (166 in 1998). 
Apart  from  Portugal  and  Greece
36
,  the  whole  population  of the  Union  can  now  choose 
between  more than one  operator  for  long  distance  and  international  calls,  and  in seven 
countries (Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom) 
they also have a choice of  operators for local calls. 
The  effective presence of competition in the  market is increasingly  evident  in the  long-
distance and international call markets, where new entrants are a significant presence: in one 
country (United Kingdom) their estimated international call  market share  is 45%;  in four 
countries (Denmark, Germany,  The Netherlands, Sweden) 30-37%; in two countries (Italy, 
35  Variatioos  in market  values  are  expressed  in nominal  tenns.  Source:  EITO  (European  Infonnation 
Technology Observatory) 1999. 
36  Portugal and Greece are due to liberalise fully on 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2000 respectively  . 
. 28 Finland) 10-15%; and in six countries (Belgium, Spain, France- for the local, national and 
international markets combined, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria) up to 5%. 
Competition is now also becoming effective even in the local call market as a result of  local 
carrier selection and unbundling of  the local loop, and in five countries (Belgium, Denmark, 
Gennany, The Netherl~ds, Austria) new entrants have an estimated market share of up to 
5%. In the UK, where liberalisation was introduced in the mid-eighties, alternative operators 
now take 18% of  the local call market. 
Mobile market 
The total number of mobile licences has increased, to 94 national licences (analogue, GSM, 
DCS) from 77 in  1998. Only two licensed operators are not yet active in the market. The 
number of  mobile operators offering digital mobile services at national level is. now 52, and 
in all Member States at least 95% of  the population has a choice of  operators. 
New entrants are  gaining increasing market share, and in two countries (Germany, United 
Kingdom)  new  entrants  are  now  the  leading  operators.  Furthennore,  in  six  countries 
(Belgium, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Finland) new entrants now have 3040% of  the 
overa11  mobile market;  in  four (Greece,  The Netherlands, Austria, Sweden) they have 40-
45%; and in two  (France, Portugal) they have more than SO%.  In the digital market, new 
entrants'  shares  are  higher,  and  in  seven  countries  (Denmark,  Greece,  France,  The 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden) new entrants have a digital mobile market share of 
more than 45%. 
Fixed network senices 
During the period August 1998 to August 1999, the number of  operators authorised to offer 
network services increased by more than 400, and the number of authorised operators per 
million inhabitants grew from 1.4 to 2.5. There are many operators now in the market: 375 in 
the  local  network  services  market;  194  in  the  long-distance  network  services  market 
(compared to 173 in 1998); and 187 in the international network services market (compared 
to 162 in 1998). 
Interconnection 
There are now 820 interconnection agreements for call termination on fixed networks
37
, 
almost double last year's figure of  442. 
In general tenns, conditions for  call termination on fixed  networks in the main European 
markets are competitive. As regards fixed-to-fixed interconnection, not only has the number 
of countries with interconnection charges above best practice
38  decreased significantly (for 
example from nine to  five  for  local level interconnection), but the percentage deviation is 
much lower: the average deviation for the countries with charges higher than best practice is 
37  Aggregate of  the figures for fixed-to-ftxed and mobile-to-ftxed. 
31  See Commission Recommendation on interconnection pricing in a liberalised environment (Part 1  ). The 
1999 best practice call termination charges are 0.5 - 1.0 EUR/cents per minute for local interconnection, 
0.8 - 1.6 EUR!cents per minute for single transit and 1.5 -2.3 EUR/cents per minute for double transit. 
29 28% for local level interconnection (73% last year),  13% for single transit (67% last year), 
and 27% for double transit (102% last year). 
The same is more or less valid for mobile-to-fixed charges, which are generally subject to the 
same conditions. At this stage, only Spain and Ireland maintain a difference between fixed-to-
fixed and mobile-to-fixed charges; however, the NRAs in these countries envisage bringing 
these conditions into line in the near future. 
Incumbents' retail tariffs 
As a result of  competition, operators are increasingly moving from charging by units to per-
second systems, which are more transparent and fairer  from  the consumer and competitor 
viewpoint.  In 1997 only five  incumbent operators were applying the per-second charging 
system, in 1998 there were seven, and in August 1999 there were ten. 
The process of tariff rebalancing is,  as  stated  in  section  3,  continuing  in  a  number of 
Member States: over the past two years there have been average annual increases, in nominal 
terms, of 4% in the price of ten-minute local calls, while the price of regional and long-
distance calls has decreased by 7%  and  15% respectively.  During the past two years the 
charge for an average international call has decreased annually by 21% for residential users 
and  by 13%  for  business users.  In  particular,  the  price  of ten-minute  international  calls 
decreased  by 17%  for  calls  to  neighboUring  countries,  by  8%  for  calls  to  more  distant 
European countries, by 23% to the US and by 11% to Japan. 
Annual expenditure for national calls has been more or less stable over the past two years for 
the typical residential user, whHe for the business user there has been an annual decrease of 
4.2%. 
A comparison with a leading US operator
9 shows that the price of  local calls remains higher 
in Europe than in the US (EU tariffs in particular for a 3 minute call are three times those in 
the US), but that the difference dramatically decreases for  1  0-minute local calls (which are 
20% higher), and that for regional and long-distance calls, the tariffs of the US operator a,re 
higher than the EU average. International calls from the EU to the US are double the cost of 
calls from the US to the_ EU, while a comparison with the Japanese incumbent
40  shows that 
international calls originating in Europe are 70% cheaper than those originating in Japan. 
National/eased lines 
The average tariff for national leased lines decreased steadily over the period from August 
1996  to  August  1999.  The trend of average  standard  retail  tariffs  for  digital  leased line 
services was as follQ..ws:  64 Kbit/s leased lines decreased in price by 45% in the case of 50 
and 200 km lines and by 28% in the case of  2 km lines, and 2 Mbit/s leased lines decreased in 
price by 45% in the case of 50 and 200 km lines and by 35% in the case of 2 km lines. The 
decrease in the price of analogue circuits (M.1 020) of 50 and 200 km was more modest at 
about 17%. 
39  Figures  for  Nynex/Bell Atlantic,  which can be regarded as  purely  indicative,  and will  vary  with  other 
operators. 
4o  NIT 
30 However, comparisons of leased line prices chareed by incumbent operators in each 
Member State u  of 1 August 1999 show that the same service may be charged at very 
different prices, which does not appear justifiable even if  differina underlyina costs are 
accepted.  · 
Int~rnationllll~IISed  lines 
The average tariff for international leased lines has decreased over the period from August 
1996 to August 1999. The trend in EU average retail tariffs for digital leaSed .line services 
was as follows: the  averag~ standard tariff for 64 Kbit/s connections to European countries 
and  the US has  decreased  by over 30%;  the  average  tariff for  2  Mbitls· connections  to 
European countries and the US has decreased by between 22% and  2~/o. Dec~  in the 
tariff for analogue circuits (M.l  020) have been more modest, by 3% to 9% for connections to 
European countries and the US. 
However, the level of prices as of 1 August 1999 remains relatively hl&b If  compared to 
the-price of similar national services. For instance, the averaae ltalldard retan tariff for 
l Mbit/s international half~ircuits is from 7 to 14 times higher than for natlonallOO km 
circuits.  · 
The provision of  national and international high capacity circuits (34 and ISS Mbit/s) is still 
under development and standard prices for those services are available only in a few Member 
States. In most cases, at least for 155 Mbit/s circuits, they are given only on a case-by-case 
basis. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND PRINCIPLES FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE 1999 REVIEW 
It is clear from the Commission's analysis of  the national legislation in place, its application 
by the national authorities, and the evidence from the market that, less than two years after 
full liberalisation, overall implementation of the telecoms regulatory package has been and 
continues to be a success. 
However,  the  Commission,  given  its  role  as  guardian  of the  Treaty  and  the  institution 
responsible for the procedures ensuring complianc~ with the directives, is bound to focus in 
reports such as this on those aspects of  Member ~tates' practical application of  the regulation 
which are not in compliance with the regulatory framework.  In this regard the role of the 
Commission in enforcing compliance with the regulatory framework has been acknowledged 
in the preparation of  this report, by new market entrants and regulators alike. With the launch 
of  the Communication on the review of the regulatory framework, the Commission's task is 
to use the lessons of  the past to build the regulation of  the first decade of  the new millennium 
and beyond, and it is in this spirit that the critical aspects of  this report are offered. There are 
in this context a number of  messages; correspondinc proposals from tile Commtuioa for 
remedial action, where appropriate, are set out in the Communication on the review. 
BeUerharmonhadon 
While the process of  creating a single market for telecommunicationS services is well under 
way under the current framework, the provision of  pan-European services and cross-border 
investment is still hampered by the relatively low level of harmonisation in the European 
31 directives in particular of the  licensing regime  and to  a  lesser  extent  the  interconnection 
regime. It is clear here that there is enormous pressure from all parts of  the market for action 
(see below). 
Uniform implementation 
Experience of  the implementation of  the current regulatory framework shows that even where 
the directives are drafted relatively tightly there are considerable divergences in the way in 
which the principles are applied in the Member States. There are  already mechanisms for 
achieving uniformity, such as through the High Level Committee of  National Administrations 
and  Regulatory  Authorities  and the  Open Network Provision  and  Licensing  Committees. 
There is nonetheless a sense on the part of regulators and the market that this coordination 
should be sharpened. 
NRA.s 
There is a preliminary point which is obvious but which is worth reiterating. The NRAs are 
the rock on which full and uniform implementation of the regulatory package is built. They 
need a strongly supportive national framework to enable them to  function effectively. This 
includes providing them with the necessary human and financial resources and the legal and 
political envi~onment  which will enable them to perform their prescribed tasks. 
The fact that the NRAs differ widely across the Member States is the result of the different 
legal and adMinistrative cultures in which they are  rooted,  and  this diversity is in turn a 
natural and welcome part of  the culture of  the Union. There is currently coordination between 
the  regulatory agencies through the Independent Regulators'  Group,  which  contributes to 
strengthening uniformity of  implementation. There is, however, no form ofbenchmarking for 
example  on  supervision  of the  incumbent's  cost  accounting,  approval  of the  reference 
interconnection offer, consultation procedures, response times or reporting on service quality 
or consumer complaints. 
The disparities in the way in which NRAs are organised are reflected also in the procedures 
laid  down  for  appeals  against  their  decisions.  Again,  these  are  rooted  in  the  legal  and · 
administrative cultures of the Meniber States, and as such are sometimes lengthy and may 
depend on a judiciary which may not be qualified to examine the technical complexities of 
telecommunications. Appeals procedures may also have suspensory effect which, in a fast-
moving market, is likely to prejudice the interests in particular of new entrants, as do delays 
in clarification of  the applicable regulatory regime generally. 
There are further disparities in the way in which regulatory powers are divided as between 
ministries,  regulatory  agencies,  national  competition  authorities,  and  sometimes  other 
agencies with responsibility for example for regulating tariffs. This can lead to conflicts or at 
the least to an administrative barrier to new entrants. There are also disparities as regards the 
way in which responsibility for handling consumer complaints is  allocated, which leads to 
consumer uncertainty as to the protection of  their rights. 
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Pan-European operators including satellite operators back their argument in favour of better 
hannonisation of  the licensing regime at European level by pointing to the wide differences in 
procedures, periods of validity, fees,  classifications of operators with which they are faced, 
not to mention the difficulty of submitting applications in the eleven official Community 
languages. 
Virtually all operators are  opposed to heavy regimes,  for the obvious reason that they are 
costly, time-consuming and potentially exclusive. The experience of Member States which 
already have light regimes is that they operate successfully, mesh well with ·a liberalised 
environment, and lighten the regulatory burden on the NRAs. 
The current rules on licence fees  and the principle that they should cover only the cost of 
administering authorisations have  also  been implemented in widely different ways in the 
Member States. There has been no benchmarking exercise in this regard. 
Interconnection 
This Report shows that the powers of  the regulator as currently set out in the framework are 
not always devolved to the NRAs at national level, or in some cases exist but are not used. 
This is particularly true of the power to intervene directly in interconnection negotiations 
without being invited to do so by the parties. Some regulators contend that the emphasis in 
the  framework  on  commercial  negotiation  (and  In  the  national  context  on  freedom  of 
contract),  together with the  right of parties  to  request  intervention,  makes  such a  power 
redundant. This view is not shared by the generally weaker parties to such negotiations, that 
is, new entrants with negligible market power. There is currently no mandate in.the directives 
for NRAs to  impose penalties on SMP operators for failure to produce RIOs or negotiate 
interconnection in timely fashion. 
There is a considerable problem as regards the cost accounting of  the incumbent operators for 
the tariffing of interconnection. There appear to be major weakness both in the regulation at 
national level and in the practices applied by NRAs, as regards cost accounting not only for 
interconnection but also for the provision of  leased lines and voice telephony, in particular in 
the latter case to ensure correct rebalancing of  tariffs. One result appears to the existence of 
price squeezes in  a number of Member States.  However, the implementation .process has 
shown on the one hand how effective benchmarking at EU level has been in bringing down 
interconnection prices; on the other, several Member States have used benchmarking with EU 
and  non-EU  countries'  tariffs  to  orientate  their  national  interconnection  tariffs.  The 
Commission's benchmarking exercise will be continued at least for the lifetime of  the present 
regulatory package. 
Universal service 
Although there is currently only one universal service fund in operation, it is clear from the 
implementation exercise that  there  is concern on the part of operators in Member States 
where financing mecbanisms are likely to be put into effect. Most regard funding mechanisms 
as  a  barrier to market  entry,  and  are  confident  in  many cases of being able  to  provide 
universal service in their areas of operation on a competitive basis. There is therefore a need 
33 to ensure tliat 'the assessment of the real net costs of universal service provision is rigorous, 
with particular attention being paid to the intangible benefits deriving from the provision of 
universal service. As regards the category of operators which may be required to contribute 
through funding mechanisms, account should be taken of the current and forecast growth in 
· the mobile market. 
Furthennore,  where  full  rebalancing  has  been  achieved  and  no  access  deficit  remains, 
universal service can be achieved on the basis of low-user tariff schemes, without further 
need to rely ofi·universal service charges that fonn potential barriers to market entry  .. 
Consumer rights clearly need to be taken into account in the implementation of the current 
regulatory framework, in particular with regard to transparency of  infonnation and redress. In 
specific  cases  such  as  lack of transparency  of tariff structures  or unfair  contract  tenns, 
Member States could apply the cUITent framework more effectively while making better use 
of  existing horizontal Community consumer protection legislation. 
A barrier to the single market resides in the fact that the  112 European emergency number, 
while available in all Member States and largely publicised by operators, is not known by 
consumers to be available also in other countries of the Union. This problem also can be 
tackled under the current framework. 
Jmprov~d  coordination with the application of  the competition rules 
The comments expressed in the preparation of  the report regarding leased line tariffs or lack 
of  rebalancing of  local loop tariffs show that notwithstanding the provisions of  sector-specific 
legislation applicable for many years, new market players still face difficulties in a number of 
areas.  Generally,  it  is  evident that  under  the  present  regulatory  framework  local  access 
competition  remains  problematic  in  all  Member  States,  and  that  certain  barriers  to  the 
development of transnational services and infrastructure persist. The Commission therefore 
decided on 27 July 1999 to open a sector inquiry under the EU competition rules relating to 
the level of  leased lines tariffs, the level of  roaming charges and the tariffs for the provision of 
access to and use of  the residential local loop. By means of  this investigation, the Commission 
wishes to detennine whether the practices and prices observed constitute infringements of  EC 
competition rules, in particular of Articles 81  and 82 of the EC Treaty. If the Commission 
finds such infringements, it will both act against them on a case by case basis, and consider 
the  scope  for  future  horizontal measures.  The  Commission will involve both the national 
regulators  and  the  national  competition  authorities  in  this  process.  As  close  cooperation 
between competition authorities and national regulators is a general prerequisite to ensure a 
level playing field in the telecommunications markets it should further be improved. 
Other conclusions 
Numbering 
The Commission is encouraged by progress in introducing number portability and carrier pre· 
selection in some Member States, in some cases ahead of the deadline set.  It is concerned, 
however, at possible delays in particular in putting in place carrier pre-selection for all calls 
from fixed networks and in the way in which costs are to· be apportioned between operators 
and consumers. As regards number portability, account should be taken of the fact that some 
34 Member States have  extended  the  obligation  to  mobile  operators,  thereby  increasing the 
scope of  competition in this sector. 
Rights of  way 
The fact  that rights of way are very often in many Member States in the hands of local or 
regional  authorities  and  may  be  subject  to  planning  and  other non telecommunications-
specific constraints means that regulators' hands are sometimes tied. Some Member States 
have  taken  action  to  apply  creative  solutions  under the  current  regulatozy  framework  at 
national and local level, in particular as regards colocation and site-sharing. · · 
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